Security model

SQRL assumes one thing: that Bitcoin remains secure, since settlement, ordering and finality derive from it. On that assumption the protocol gives guarantees any party can check for itself.

Updated 08 Nov 20262 min read

#Guarantees

  • Deterministic replay. Identical inputs yield identical outputs on every node.
  • Objective disputes. Correctness is provable from the contract commitment, the protocol stamp, execution traces and the block's state root.
  • Automatic rejection. Invalid transitions are discarded without forks or coordination.
  • Replay and front-run resistance. Anchor-outpoint binding ties every call envelope to exactly one Bitcoin transaction.
  • Divergence detection. Per-block state roots make any disagreement between nodes detectable and auditable from the confirmed call log.
  • Bounded stall exposure. Partition-scoped state confines data withholding to the withholder's own transaction footprint, time-boxed by the void window. See Global and partitioned state.
  • Validator accountability without validator trust. Seats attest to state they cannot falsify undetected; a dishonest quorum can disrupt the liveness of attestation, never the correctness of state.
  • Subnet integrity without subnet transparency. A closed subnet's history is bound to Bitcoin anchors it cannot rewrite, while its data stays inside the membership boundary.
  • Quantum-reliable integrity. Verifying the ledger is replay against hash-based commitments, which survive quantum cryptanalysis. See Post-quantum security.

#Cryptographic primitives

  • Commitments. The hash of a contract's bytecode binds its semantics; any change produces a different hash with overwhelming probability.
  • Collision resistance. With SHA-256, the probability of two different bytecodes sharing a hash is negligible (below 2⁻¹²⁸).
  • Authorisation. Calls are authorised by the keys that control the Bitcoin outputs they spend.
  • Replay protection. Each envelope names the unique outpoint its anchoring transaction must spend.

#Trust boundaries

  • Bitcoin data source. Nodes read transactions and UTXOs from a configured backend and verify the fields used for execution: commitment outputs, relevant UTXOs and confirmation depth.
  • Caches. Cached Bitcoin responses and indexes are optimisations; every correctness-critical decision is reproducible from canonical inputs.
  • Reorgs. Recent transactions are pending until a confirmation threshold, and a 144-block journal rolls back and replays shallow reorganisations.

#Keys

The protocol imposes no custody model beyond standard Bitcoin key ownership. Institutional anchoring and issuer keys are expected to live in the institution's existing HSM and key-ceremony infrastructure; individual signers use hardware wallets or the SQRL wallet. Confirm transaction outputs and OP_RETURN contents before you sign.

#Denial of service

Execution ceilings, payload and request limits, rate limiting on expensive endpoints, and configurable retention for payload history and indexes bound the worst-case cost of evaluation and storage for adversarial workloads. The reference implementation maintains golden test vectors, cross-platform determinism checks and fuzzing to keep independent evaluators in agreement.

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